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This article examines the parliamentary processes available to scrutinise draft
social security regulations in the UK, highlighting the democratic deficit that exists
between executive power and parliamentary authority, and reviewing the unique
scrutiny function of the UK Social Security Advisory Committee. The article
explores the development of devolved social security powers in Northern Ireland
and Scotland and the oversight gap that is now emerging between devolved and
reserved powers, with the potential for unintended adverse consequences arising
for claimants moving between the different systems within the UK. The article
considers the oversight options that might be developed to include independent
and expert oversight of devolved social security provision in Scotland, focusing
on the need to enable system coherence and fairness in the treatment of claimants,
regardless of their geographical circumstances.
Introduction
As the UK continues to spin on its constitutional axis, the devolution of social
security has generated some new constitutional revolutions. In Northern Ireland,
the stalled Welfare Reform Bill acted as the lightning rod for political turmoil and
the ensuing threat of constitutional crisis. For Scotland, the authority to exercise
autonomy, short of independence, through a tailored system of social security was
a central focus of intergovernmental discussions on the Scotland Act 2016. In
England and Wales, where there is no devolutionary power over social security,
the focus instead has been on localisation, with control (if not matching budgets)
of some social security provision moving from central government to local
authorities, and with considerable local discretion attached to the priorities dictating
* The author is also a member of the Social Security Advisory Committee. The views expressed in this article
should not be taken to represent the views of the Committee. The author is grateful to Dr Mark Simpson, Ulster
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disbursement.1 Operationally, the Scottish perspective on ensuring cohesion between
social security systems has focused on whether there would be a separate and
independent Scottish social security agency, or a Scottish wing of the Department
for Work and Pensions (DWP). In Northern Ireland, although social security has
been a devolved matter since 1920, regional oversight has traditionally been of
secondary importance to the maintenance of parity of provision with Great Britain.
Cohesion with (or duplication of) DWP policy and operations has largely been a
given, albeit with some variation around the edges, and for which joined up
approaches can be ensured.
The core features of social security remain broadly similar throughout each of
the devolved regions in the UK, and the devolutionary powers operate to make
discrete or partial change rather than fundamental reform. In one sense, therefore,
the social security landscape across the UK is not drastically altered: the
devolutionary developments have not been about radical departures from the
uniform model—an ambition hampered by structural limitations set centrally at
Westminster and fiscal realities that put some aspirations beyond reach—but about
changing the outcomes, generally focusing more on mitigation than prevention.
Yet it would be naïve to assume that the range of different reforms and processes
across different parts of the UK will not have significant impact in their totality
and in the individual cases to which they will apply. The co-ordination of social
security, once a straightforward arrangement, is now impacted by increased policy
divergence across the UK and the corresponding financial consequences, and that
is before any of the constitutional uncertainty flowing from “Brexit” begins to take
hold (an issue beyond the reach of this article).2
With so much change, across so many different and moving parts, there is a
need to understand the cumulative impact—not just on the local populations who
are the focus of devolved governance, but on those populations that move within
and between the devolved areas, bringing what are now complex geographical
circumstances to an already complex system of assessing need. The interworking
of devolutionary and central provision will undoubtedly create difficulties, not
insurmountable and not destructive of devolution, but which will be of critical
importance to the individuals who are affected. Inevitably there needs to be a
means of anticipating and preventing unintended consequences that will present
within the system as a whole, rather than simply within the local regimes that are
being developed. In short, there is a need for oversight of the whole system so that
the sum of the different parts provides the protection intended and not the collateral
damage that an absence of joined-up working can create.
Perhaps understandably, the constitutional focus for devolution has been on
exploring the extent to which social security powers can be relinquished or reserved,
and the inevitable operational implications that flow from this; oversight has been
overlooked. This article aims to expand that constitutional focus by exploring the
need for a holistic oversight mechanism to deal with the challenges arising from
devolutionary variations within the UK system. The question of whether there
should be an oversight body to review the interaction of devolved and reserved
1 SSAC, “Localisation and Social Security: a Review, Occasional Paper No.14” (2015); Work and Pensions
Committee, “The local welfare safety net: fifth report of session 2015–16” (2015) HC 373.
2 J. Murkens, “Brexit: The Devolution Dimension” UK Constitutional Law Blog (28 June 2016) at https:/
/ukconstitutionallaw.org/ [Accessed 24 October 2016].
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social security provision is framed by the need for coherence: the individual parts
of these interconnecting social security systems must work together for claimants
throughout the UK to avoid adverse, unintended consequences.
The article begins with an exploration of how social security law is made,
examining the deficit in the constitutional oversight of social security legislation
by parliament through the increasing predominance of statutory instruments and
departmental discretion, and the increased need, therefore, for effective scrutiny
of draft regulations that aim to deliver the policy intent. An examination of the
role of oversight then follows, focusing on the unique role of the Social Security
Advisory Committee (SSAC), an independent body that provides advice to
government on social security. This is followed by an analysis of the devolutionary
arrangements for social security in the UK, to understand the political, constitutional
and financial forces that have shaped the different settlements. Finally, the article
concludes by considering the oversight options that might be developed to include
oversight of devolved social security provision in Scotland, to deal with the
problems of co-ordinating devolved social security provision, to enable coherence
and connection within the systems of social security across the UK.
Making social security law: the scrutiny gap
The legislative apparatus that supports the social security system has the standard
features of parliamentary debates and committee scrutiny of primary legislation,
focusing on the powers that can be vested in the Secretary of State to give effect
to social security policy choices, rather than on the detail of the means by which
those powers will be delivered. The reality, however, is that only the bare bones
of political power are set out in primary legislation leaving it to secondary
legislation to detail what this means in practice.3 In relation to social security law,
Ogus noted, in 1998, that “there has been an increasing tendency for legislation
to be passed in skeletal form, leaving most of the rules to be prescribed in statutory
instruments”.4 Almost 20 years later, as the House of Lords Constitution Committee
notes, this practice is now embedded:
“Successive governments have proposed primary legislation containing broad
and poorly-defined delegated powers … that give wide discretion to
ministers—often with few indications as to how those powers should be
used.”5
This may be because the parliamentary process does not appear to be sufficient to
provide full scrutiny of primary legislation: despite recent reform of the
programming of Bills, debates in Committee stage often do not reach the end of
the Bill, and so full scrutiny of the entirety of the piece, or specific provisions
within it, is concluded prematurely.6 Meanwhile the advantage of secondary
3 It is worth noting, however, that the increasingly high level nature of social security primary legislation is far less
true of state pensions than other social security benefits.
4A. Ogus, “SSAC as an independent advisory body: its role and influence on policymaking” (1998) 5 J.S.S.L 156,
168.
5Constitution Committee, “Delegated Legislation and Parliament: A response to the Strathclyde Review, 9th Report
of Session 2015–16” (2016) HL 116, p.2.
6See Select Committee on theModernisation of the House of Commons, “Programming of Bills: Session 2001–02”
(2003) H.C. 1222. L. Thompson, “More of the same or a period of change? The impact of Bill committees in the 21st
century House of Commons” (2013) 66 Parliamentary Affairs 459. In Northern Ireland and Scotland, the role of
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legislation, is the greater political flexibility it provides as governments seek to
refine policy, but this comes at a constitutional cost:
“Delegated legislation cannot be amended, so there is little scope for
compromise … [T]here is little incentive for members of either House to …
[debate] legislation that they cannot change … [and] established practice is
that the House of Lords does not vote down delegated legislation except in
exceptional circumstances. The result is that the Government can pass
legislative proposals with greater ease and with less scrutiny where they are
able to do so through secondary, rather than primary, legislation. These
developments have strengthened the Executive at the expense of Parliament’s
legislative authority.”7
Social security legislation has followed this pattern,8 leading to concerns expressed
by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (among others)9 that its ability to
scrutinise the primary powers within the Welfare Reform Act 2012 was
compromised by the vagueness of the primary legislation and the extent of political
power that was being relegated to regulations that had not yet been published in
draft form.10 Other scrutiny mechanisms are limited to technical aspects of the
legislation,11 and where policy is considered this is limited (in the Lords)12 to
non-binding advice or (in the Commons)13 to debate but not recommendations on
approval or rejection. Devolved scrutiny processes are absent a second
chamber—neither the Scottish Parliament nor the Northern Ireland Assembly has
a revising chamber, so national scrutiny gaps are not plugged by devolved
arrangements.14
There are two additional elements of lawmaking that also require consideration.
The first is the volume of statutory instruments being generated by the Executive,
relative to primary legislation:
“[By December] 2015, the UK Parliament has passed 34 Acts, while, 1,999
statutory instruments have been made. (In fact, 2015 has been a relatively
committees in legislative scrutinymust also be balanced with a range of other responsibilities—see Committee Review
Group, “Review of the committee system of the Northern Ireland Assembly” (2013) NIA 135/11–15.
7 Constitution Committee, “Delegated Legislation and Parliament” (2016) HL 116, p.2.
8 Baroness Stowell in HL Debs, Vol.730 Col.696, 13 September 2011; see also Lord Boswell in HL Debs, Vol.730
Col.708, 13 September 2011.
9 Similar concerns were expressed during parliamentary debates on the Act and in the Committee for Social
Development report on Northern Ireland’s Welfare Reform Bill: see, e.g. J. McDonnell in HC Debs, Vol.524 col.938,
9 March 2011; N. Long in HC Debs, Vol.524 col.993, 9 March 2011; Committee for Social Development, “Report
on the Welfare Reform Bill (NIA Bill 13/11–15)” (2013) NIA 74/11–15.
10Human Rights Joint Committee, “Legislative Scrutiny:Welfare ReformBill, Conclusions and Recommendations,
Twenty-First Report of Session 2010–2012” (2011) HL 233/HC 1704, paras 1.16–1.17.
11 Namely the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments (UK Parliament), Delegated Powers and Law Reform
Committee (Scottish Parliament) or Examiner of Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland Assembly): House of Commons
Information Office, “Statutory instruments: Factsheet L7” (2008); Examiner of Statutory Rules, “Report of the
Examiner of Statutory Rules to the Assembly and appropriate committees” (2008) NIA333/11-16; Scottish Parliament,
“Guide to Scottish statutory instruments” (year unknown).
12 Lords Committee on the Merits of Statutory Instruments.
13 Commons Delegated Legislation Committee.
14Although seeM. Cole, “Committee scrutiny in Scotland: a comparative and bi-constitutional perspective” (2016)
44 Policy and Politics 465, for an evaluation of the scrutiny undertaken through departmental committees at the
Scottish Parliament which is seen as an improvement on the previous scrutiny of the Scotland Office, but with scrutiny
gaps still remaining.
Legislative Scrutiny, Co-ordination and the SSAC 129
(2016) 23 J.S.S.L., Issue 3 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
light year for statutory instruments: in 2013 and 2014, 3,292 and 3,486
statutory instruments were made).”15
Fox and Blackwell have attributed the proportionally high number of statutory
instruments, in part, to the increase in social security legislation, highlighting the
potential democratic deficit in the granting of social security powers to the
executive.16
The second, additional element is where this pattern of law making is being
stretched by the reliance on discretionary powers given as guidance to
decision-makers to apply to individual social security claims.17 At its best, this
discretion provides a flexible means of filling the holes left by the legislation,
enabling a responsive approach to individual circumstances. At worst, the reliance
on discretion in place of statutory rules undermines the firm legal entitlement that
legislation can provide, and results in variation in practice which challenges the
certainty of the rule of law.18 Street-level decision makers cease to act as mere
“functionaries of the state”; rather, bureaucracies formally charged with the
implementation of policy become a further arena in which “political projects of
change and welfare state transformation are advanced”.19 The bureaucratic system
of social security administration is designed to process huge numbers of claims
with relative speed and efficiency, within strict parameters of entitlement bounded
by bright line rules.20 The insertion of multiple opportunities to exercise discretion
within this system runs counter to its economic and operational efficiency, and
the discretionary provisions are often so opaque, nuanced or complex that it seems
unreasonable to expect all decision makers to be au fait with their content, or
consistent in their interpretation and application.
The increased reliance on discretion means that its role in the social security
system has shifted from a supplementary element to a fundamental guarantor of
human rights, with a reduction in the attendant rights of appeal.21 Discretionary
15M. Elliott, “The House of Lords and secondary legislation: Some initial thoughts on the Strathclyde Review”
17 December 2015 at https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2015/12/17/the-house-of-lords-and-secondary-legislation
-some-initial-thoughts-on-the-strathclyde-review/ [Accessed 24 October 2016].
16 R. Fox and J. Blackwell, The Devil is in the Detail: Parliament and delegated legislation (London: Hansard
Society, 2014), p.3 at https://assets.contentful.com/u1rlvvbs33ri/7rCt1Vc2C4oAaGqUeiOKsw
/fdeec732b95f7562860db4fb01aed9f1/Publication__The-Devil-is-in-the-Detail-Parliament-and-Delegated-Legislation
-Executive-Summary.pdf [Accessed 31 October 2016]. For discussion of the growth in complexity of social security
law see N. Harris, Law in a Complex State (Oxford: Hart, 2015). See also the foreword to the SSAC, “Social Security
Advisory Committee Annual Report 2015–16” 2016, noting that secondary legislation is regularly presented to the
SSAC without meaningful analysis of impact.
17 Fox and Blackwell, The Devil is in the Detail (London: Hansard Society, 2014). On a similar pattern in Australia
see S. Argument, Australian democracy and Executive law-making: Practice and principle (2016) at http://www.aph
.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Whats_On/Seminars_and_Lectures/~/link.aspx?_id
=A54FCE7B3A6340FDBF67B9AAEFFDAB8F&_z=z [Accessed 24 October 2016] and G. Appleby and J. Howe,
“Scrutinising parliament’s scrutiny of delegated legislative power” (2015) 15Oxford University Commonwealth Law
Journal 3.
18For discussion of the longstanding tension between discretion and certainty in social security law see J. Baldwin,
N.Wikeley and R. Young, Judging social security: the adjudication of claims for benefit in Britain (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992).
19 E. Z. Brodkin, “Street level organisations and the welfare state” in E. Z. Brodkin and G. Marston (eds),Work
and the welfare state: street level organisations and workfare policies (Washington DC: Georgetown University
Press, 2013).
20 E. Laurie, “Judicial responses to bright line rules in social security: in search of principle” (2009) 72 Modern
Law Review 384.
21 The increasing use of front line discretion has not been an overnight development but rather reflects a major
shift over several decades in successive governments’ views of the social security system for those of working age
as being less about an entitlements payments system and more about influencing behaviour and enforcing links with
the labour market.
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Housing Payments (DHPs) provide the most robust demonstration of this point,
given the Government’s argument in R. (on the application of MA v Secretary of
State for Work and Pensions) that the discrimination embedded in the Social Sector
Size Criteria (colloquially known as the “bedroom tax”) becomes proportionate
and justifiable through the discretionarymitigation provided byDHPs.22 In addition,
discretionary provision, administered locally, further evidences the trend towards
localisation—particularly in relation to what was originally the social fund, and
the independent living fund, as well as council tax benefit, and UC and universal
support delivered locally—where fewer oversight mechanisms exist.23
The pattern of reducing parliamentary scrutiny is continuing with the
government-commissioned Strathclyde Review which recommended removing
the power of the House of Lords to veto statutory instruments by granting powers
to the House of Commons to override the Lords’ opposition to secondary
legislation.24 The responses of the House of Lords Constitution Committee and the
Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee are highly critical of the
proposal, with the former stating that such reform “risks turning an already deeply
flawed process into a farce”.25 The responses identify an incentive to take
controversial powers out of primary legislation and use inferior secondary
legislation scrutiny provision to extend executive powers. At the heart of the
objections is that the Review incorrectly focuses on the balance of power between
the Commons and the Lords, when what is at stake is the balance of power between
the executive and parliament:
“The focus should be on how to ensure that the actions of the Executive are
scrutinised effectively and that parliamentary approval of delegated
legislation—by members of both Houses of Parliament—is not a mere
box-ticking exercise.”26
Once again, the implications for social security are profound. The nature of social
security provision is further removed today than ever before from the ideological
conception on which state social security was built, moving away from a state
controlled, insurance based system of rights, built on contributions that spread,
22R. (on the application of MA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] EWCA Civ 13; [2014] P.T.S.R.
584; J. Meers, “Panacean Payments: The Role of Discretionary Housing Payments in the Welfare Reform Agenda”
(2015) 22 J.S.S.L. 115. That the legal challenge mounted against this provision has had to be via judicial review is
mandated by the exclusion of DHPs from the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal, limiting the accessibility of legal
challenge and accountability. See also the report of the SSAC raising concerns that claimant awareness of DHPs was
not universal: “Report on the Housing Benefit and Universal Credit (Size Criteria) (Misc Amendments) Regulations
2013” (2013). See further the SSAC, “Minutes: March 2016” s.2.4(h) which identify the increasing practice of relying
on detailed and specific guidance for decision makers in order to advise claimants of the correct legal position and
the implications of their behaviour vis à vis their benefit entitlement.
23 SSAC, “Localisation and Social Security” (2015), pp.11–18.
24 See M. Elliott, “Parliament, government and secondary legislation: Lords Select Committees respond to the
Strathclyde Review” 23 March 2016 at https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/03/23/parliament-government-and
-secondary-legislation-lords-select-committees-respond-to-the-strathclyde-review/ [Accessed 24 October 2016]. The
reviewwas commissioned in the wake of the House of Lords vote to delay secondary legislation relating to tax credits
cuts: “Strathclyde Review: Secondary legislation and the primacy of the House of Commons” (2015) Cm.9177 at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486790/53088_Cm_9177_Web
_Accessible.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2016]. See G. McKeever, “Tax credits” (2016) 23 J.S.S.L. 12–13.
25 Constitution Committee, “Delegated Legislation and Parliament” (2016) HL 116 p.18; the original source for
this quotation is R. Fox and J. Blackwell, “Reflections on the Strathclyde Review” 13 January 2016 at https:/
/constitution-unit.com/2016/01/13/reflections-on-the-strathclyde-review/ [Accessed 24 October 2016]. See also the
Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, “Special Report: Response to the Strathclyde review, 25th
report of session 2015–16” (2016) HL 119.
26 Constitution Select Committee, “Delegated Legislation and Parliament” (2016) HL 116 p.19.
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collectively, the poverty risks associated with unemployment, sickness, old age
and death, to a model where the responsibility for controlling risk shifts to the
individual, who is managed through a growing set of conditions and attendant
sanctions,27 with state responsibilities diluted and dispersed to different layers of
decision makers and local budgets.28 Nonetheless, the most elemental feature of
the law making process is that the executive’s ideological ambitions cannot take
priority over parliamentary sovereignty and so the role of statutory oversight by
parliament remains critical. The independent judicial review provided by litigation
can help to remedy some of the deficiency in scrutiny, but this is necessarily an
individual cure rather than systematic prevention. Given the oversight deficit in
the legislative apparatus, anything that provides an additional layer of scrutiny of
social security regulations can bewelcomed as supporting parliamentary sovereignty
and ensuring legitimacy.
The role of oversight bodies: plugging the scrutiny gap?
Oversight bodies can provide scrutiny of government actions, increasing
government’s accountability and transparency while providing advice as to how
government functions and policy objectives might be improved or discharged.
These arms-length bodies (ALBs) perform a consultative or expert role, and are
intended to bring independence and expertise into the delivery of policy, to help
regulate services, and to provide advice.29 Their main advantage is seen to be their
ability to de-politicise decision making and build public trust, as well as providing
access to specialist advice and expertise that would be more costly to deliver
through consultancy-based services.30 The advantages, however, have been often
regarded as insufficient to off-set the public, political and media perspectives of
ALBs as unaccountable, wasteful, and self-serving, leading successive political
leaders to make manifesto promises about their abolition. The most recent assault
was conducted by the UK Coalition Government in 2010: 904 organisations were
reviewed across 16 departments within five months. The review established a
two-fold test for whether a body was to be retained. First, does the body need to
exist or is its role/function now superfluous? Secondly, if its function is necessary,
does the function need to be undertaken outside a department? The second question
was to be answered in reference to three specific criteria: does it perform a technical
function? Does it need to be politically impartial? Does it act independently to
establish facts? The resulting “bonfire of the quangos” was the abolition of more
27 N. Harris, “From unemployment to active jobseeking: changes and continuities in social security law in the
United Kingdom” in S. Stendahl, T. Erhag and S. Devetzi (eds), A European work-first welfare state (Gothenburg:
Centre for European Research, 2008); M. Adler, “A new leviathan: benefit sanctions in the 21st century” (2016) 43
Journal of Law and Society 195.
28 See, e.g. DHPs—and the role of discretion more broadly—as part of the government’s ideological drive towards
austerity: J. Meers, “Panacean Payments” (2015) 22 J.S.S.L. 115, 120.
29 Also known as quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (Quangos) and non-departmental public
bodies (NDPBs). See PublicAdministration Select Committee, “Who’s accountable? Relationships between government
and arms-length bodies: first report of session 2014–15” (2014) HC 110.
30 T. Gash, I. Magee, J. Rutter and N. Smith, Read Before Burning: Arm’s length government for a new
administration, (Institute for Government, 2010) at http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files
/publications/Read%20before%20burning.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2016].
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than 150 bodies which failed to meet the test, and the merger of 160 bodies into
fewer than 70.31
The Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) was one of the ALBs that
survived untouched.32 Sponsored by the DWP, the SSAC provides advice to the
Secretary of State and the relevant Northern Ireland department on social security
and related matters.33 When the Committee was set up in 1980,34 the Secretary of
State noted that:
“For the first time Ministers and the House will have the benefit of advice
from an independent advisory body which spans the major part of our social
security system.”35
The SSAC’s advice function covers three areas:
“First, the Secretary of State may seek its advice on any matter within its
remit. Secondly, the Committee may give advice on any such matter, whether
or not it has been specifically asked to do so. The third function is believed
to be unique for an advisory body dealing with such a highly significant area
of policymaking. The Secretary of State is under a duty to submit to it for
comments all proposals for making regulations, in the form of subordinate
legislation, under the relevant parliamentary enactments.”36
In practice, the SSAC’s advice is given predominantly through the mandatory
scrutiny of proposals in the form of draft regulations, helping to plug the legislative
scrutiny gap that arises from parliamentary processes.37 Some areas of social
security are exempt from scrutiny,38 as are any regulations promulgated within six
months of the primary legislation.39 In addition, urgency provisions may be invoked
where the Government considers that it is necessary to lay the regulations before
the SSAC has had time to scrutinise them, but the regulations must then be referred
to the SSAC after they have been laid.40
31See Cabinet Office, Public bodies 2015: save, deliver, transform (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads
/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/506880/Public_Bodies_2015_Web_9_Mar_2016.pdf [Accessed 31 October
2016]; see also Shrinking the State project outputs at http://shrinkingthestate.group.shef.ac.uk [Accessed 24 October
2016].
32 Another ALB, the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council, has a very specific social security remit, to provide
expert scientific advice on the Industrial Injuries Scheme, and has continued to survive DWP reviews: see DWP,
“Triennial Review of the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council” (2015) at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications
/industrial-injuries-advisory-council-triennial-review-2015 [Accessed 24 October 2016]. A third ALB, the
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, that had oversight of DWP decision making, was abolished in 2013:
see C. Skelcher, “Reforming the oversight of administrative justice 2010–2014: does the UK need a new Leggatt
Report?” (2015) Public Law 215–224; G. McKeever, “Improving decision making in Employment and Support
Allowance” (2014) 21 J.S.S.L. 13.
33 Social Security Administration Act 1992 s.170 and the Social Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act
1992 ss.149–151 and Sch 5.
34 Social Security Act 1980 ss.9–10. See N. Wikelely, and A. Ogus, The Law of Social Security (Butterworths:
London, 2002), pp.137–138.
35 HL Debs. Vol.407 col.1268, 1 April 1980.
36 Ogus, “SSAC as an independent advisory body” (1998) 5 J.S.S.L. 156, 156.
37 See J. Logie, “The Social Security Advisory Committee” (1989) 23 Social Policy and Administration 248 for
discussion on the Committee’s functions.
38 Namely industrial injuries, child support, and war pensions or occupational pensions.
39 The Committee can, however, be invited to comment informally on regulations made within 6 months of the
primary legislation.
40 The 6 months rule was an established pattern that was formalised through the Social Security Act 1986 s.61,
and the urgency provisions gave effect to a situation that had originally been considered as part of the Social Security
Bill in 1980 but was not regarded at the time as likely to arise. The most recent use of the urgency provisions by the
Secretary of State was in relation to Jobseeker’s Allowance (Habitual Residence) Amendment Regulations 2013 (SI
2013/3196), and for the Northern Ireland Department of Social Development in relation to Housing Benefit (Executive
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Of particular relevance to this article is the constitution of the Committee, which
reflects the statutory requirement for one of the 13 members to be appointed by
the Secretary of State after consultation with the head of the Northern Ireland
department.41 Custom and practice has been to ensure that there are members
appointed to represent Scotland and Wales, to assist the Committee’s scrutiny of
the potential issues arising for devolved jurisdictions. The Scottish and Welsh
appointments are not made in formal consultation with the respective Secretaries
of State, but informal discussions with senior officials in Scotland and Wales take
place at various stages throughout the recruitment process, with officials part of
the interview panels, and Secretaries of State are notified of the appointments.42
The result has been that the Committee has been constituted purposely to enable
it to look at the structure of social security benefits across the UK and to consider
the regional implications that arise, although a single appointment for each of the
devolved jurisdictions is perhaps nominal rather than substantive representation.
Following the outcome of the 2010 public bodies review, the Cabinet Office
confirmed that the SSAC’s function remained necessary and that it met all three
criteria used to determine whether the function should be undertaken outside the
department.43 The DWP’s 2012 review of the SSAC found that the decision to
retain rested in particular on the grounds of performing functions requiring political
impartiality.44 The review team concluded that the Committee plays a useful role
in scrutinising regulations and providing advice on the implications, interactions
and possible unintended consequences of government proposals.45 In addition, it
found that the SSAC’s specialised technical knowledge of social security matters
was its greatest strength and that political impartiality and independence from
Ministers was crucial and would be particularly important at a time of major reform
to the welfare system.46 Three years later, the 2015 review of the SSAC concluded
that:
“The … reasons [cited in the 2012 review] for additional scrutiny of social
security secondary legislation still stand. Nothing has happened in the time
since June 2012 to weaken these arguments. Some of the responses to the
external consultation would suggest that this additional scrutiny has… never
been more important.”47
The context in which the SSAC was created in 1980 is vastly different from the
context of social security delivery today, both in terms of the core principles
underpinning social security that place reduced emphasis on contributory benefits
Determinations) (Amendment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015 (SR 2015/2). The former Regulations were
challenged unsuccessfully before the Upper Tribunal in Scotland as being ultra vires, the failed argument being that
the urgency required was of the Secretary of State’s own making: CSH/110/2015.
41 Social Security Administration Act 1992 Sch.5 para.3(1)(c). The Schedule also provides for the appointment of
2 members after consultation with organisations representative of employers (para.3(1)(a)) and organisations
representative of workers (para.3(1)(b)) as well as the inclusion of at least 1 person with experience of the needs of
the chronically sick and disabled.
42 The Committee has also appointed regional advisers in the past, to strengthen its awareness of regional issues.
43 Cabinet Office and Efficiency and Reform Group, “Public bodies reform: proposals for change” (2011).
44DWP, “A Review by the Department forWork and Pensions of the Social Security Advisory Committee” (2012).
45DWP, “A Review by the Department for Work and Pensions of the Social Security Advisory Committee” (2012)
p.5.
46DWP, “A Review by the Department for Work and Pensions of the Social Security Advisory Committee” (2012)
p.5.
47 S. Stoney, “Triennial review report: Social Security Advisory Committee” (2015, DWP) p.13.
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and more focus on conditionality and discretionary decision-making, and in terms
of the devolutionary developments that see the system moving away from the
centre towards local control. Yet the Committee has demonstrated its durability
through all of this, managing not just to avoid the constitutional concerns that have
condemned other ALBs, but to use its oversight function to contribute to the checks
and balances of constitutional scrutiny, adding value in particular to the work of
theWork and Pensions Committee, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee,
and that of individual MPs and Peers.48 Scrutinising the changing nature of social
security provision is a challenge that the Committee has proved able to manage.
What has not been tested fully, however, is how the role of the Committee can
develop with the changing devolutionary landscape.
Devolutionary social security in the UK
The devolutionary arrangements across the UK have been ad hoc and asymmetric,
politically driven rather than developed in accordance with agreed constitutional
principles.49 There are no obvious international comparators to guide how social
security devolution might work, given that the UK does not fit easily into the
traditional devolutionary models of cooperative or competitive federalism.
Co-operative federalism exists where power is decentralised but there is a common
policy framework across central and devolved administrations, providing a baseline
statement of rights with defined boundaries beyond which the devolved
administrations cannot go. In Keating’s analysis, this involves the “the federal
level legislating on broad principles and the lower level filling in the details”.50
Competitive federalism, however, sees governments competing for economic
advantage, “to attract desirable residents”, with the potential outcome for social
rights being either a race to the bottom or—as Keating has characterised the pattern
in the UK and Europe—a race to the top.51 Section 87 of the Northern Ireland Act
1998, which requires cooperation on the coordination of social security systems
between Northern Ireland and Britain, might well be an example of cooperative
federalism. At the same time, the relationship between the Scottish and UK
Governments might be more typical of competitive federalism, given the Scottish
National Party (SNP) rhetoric on providing something different—“better” —than
exists under the social security system in Britain.52
Nor is there a clear guide to navigating the inherent conflict with devolutionary
arrangements, between ensuring coherence between national and devolved provision
and enabling devolutionary diversity. Some devolutionary states have sought to
strike a balance between coherence and diversity in core welfare services by
establishing minimum standards through national framework legislation while
48 See evidence to the 2012 Review of the value of SSAC to the parliamentary scrutiny process: DWP, “A Review
by the Department for Work and Pensions of the Social Security Advisory Committee” (2012) p.12. See also HL
Debs, Vol.730 col.684, 13 September 2011 (on theWelfare Reform Bill); Public Bill Committee, 17 September 2015,
6th sitting, col.255 (on the Welfare Reform andWork Bill); HC Debs, Vol.604 col.295, 6 January 2016 (on Universal
Credit Work Allowance).
49 Constitution Select Committee, “The Union and devolution: 10th report of session 2015–16” (2016) HL 149.
50M. Keating, The government of Scotland: public policy making after devolution (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2010), p.138.
51M. Keating, “Intergovernmental relations and innovation: from co-operative to competitive welfare federalism
in the UK” (2012) British Journal of Politics and International Relations 214, 217.
52 See Scottish Government, “Creating a Fairer Scotland: A New Future for Social Security in Scotland” (2016)
at http://www.gov.scot/Topics/People/fairerscotland/future-powers/Publications/Future [Accessed 24 October 2016].
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allowing for significant regional divergence in how these minimum standards
might be supplemented,53 or by constitutionally designating particular fields of
policy as shared competences.54 However, this approach has not been a significant
feature of the UK landscape, in which a stricter division of competences had been
maintained,55 but with changes in devolved powers and governments the division
of competence has been blurred, creating greater potential for intergovernmental
conflict. The shifts between coherence and divergence will always be finely
balanced, but the need to protect social security claimants moving between systems
from adverse, unintended consequences remains paramount.
Northern Ireland
Social security has been a devolved issue in Northern Ireland since the Government
of Ireland Act 1920, under which the powers to create a Northern Ireland specific
social security systemwere handed to a unionist-controlled Parliament of Northern
Ireland and have remained within Northern Ireland’s control save for intervening
periods of direct rule from Westminster.56 The unionist government’s manifesto
was to maintain Northern Ireland as part of the UK, governed in the same way and
under the same laws as the rest of the UK. This political imperative of parity
ignored the differing manifestations and extent of poverty in Northern Ireland, and
the fiscal impossibilities that a matched system of social security provision created:
higher levels of unemployment in the region created the simultaneous consequence
of greater demand on the national insurance system at a time when there were
fewer people paying national insurance contributions. Subsidies from the UK
Exchequer that were offered on a temporary basis in 1926 have been effectively
maintained since then, further embedding the convention of parity.57 The resulting
symmetry between the social security systems in Britain and Northern Ireland is
recognised in the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which does not prescribe parity but
underlines the rationale for its continued practice.58 Section 87 of the Act requires
consultation on the co-ordination of policy between the relevantMinisters in Britain
and Northern Ireland but the reality is that agreement on social security
developments is premised on a financial imperative that reduces the scope for
ideological or operational divergence.
A co-ordinated process, however, has the advantage of shared oversight, allowing
the Northern Ireland department to move into DWP’s slipstream, to mirror the
53 A. Losada and R. Máiz, “Devolution and involution: defederalisation politics through educational policies in
Spain (1996–2004)” (2005) 15 Regional and Federal Studies 437; G. Rodríguez Cabrero, “La protección social de
la dependencia en España: un modelo sui generis de desarrollo de los derechos sociales” (2007) 44 Política y Sociedad
69.
54A. Benz, Intergovernmental relations in German federalism: joint decision-making and the dynamics of horizontal
cooperation (Hagen: Fernuniversität in Hagen, 2009).
55M. Keating, “What’s wrong with asymmetrical government?” (1998) 8 Regional and Federal Studies 195; A.
Trench, “Legislative comment: the Government of Wales Act 2006: the next steps on devolution for Wales” (2006)
Public Law 687.
56Devolution was suspended for most of the period from 1972 to 2007. See G.Walker, “Scotland, Northern Ireland
and Devolution: Past and Present” (2010) 24 Contemporary British History 235; M. Simpson, “Developing
constitutional principles through firefighting: social security parity in Northern Ireland” (2015) 22 J.S.S.L. 31.
57 Simpson, “Developing constitutional principles through firefighting” (2015) 22 J.S.S..L 31, 36–37.
58Northern Ireland Act 1998 s.7. See G.McKeever, “Reforming social security appeal tribunals in Northern Ireland:
parity whether we Leggatt or not?” (2010) 17 J.S.S.L. 71, 77–78.
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DWP regulations that have already been subject to scrutiny.59 Difficulties in the
mirror-image model can arise from either the differential impacts on Northern
Ireland,60 or where cross-departmental impacts arise, particularly where Northern
Ireland departments have not reflected the profile of their British counterparts.61
From an oversight perspective, there is a need to be attentive to these variations,
and to work within the limitations of a parity model, focusing on parity of outcome
through the avoidance of unintended, geographically specific consequences.
Birrell and Heenan have argued that the SSAC has paid relatively little attention
to Northern Ireland, in part because “UK-wide bodies do not pay a great deal of
attention to Northern Ireland matters …”.62 It is true that one member cannot
adequately provide the definitive voice of a jurisdiction—whether for Northern
Ireland, Scotland or Wales—and that the national sub-state positions could be
represented better, for example through home-grown advisory groups that feed
into a coordinated consultation input. But while there is always the difficulty that
the single perspective gets lost within the wider discussion, there is also evidence
of the SSAC taking a specific interest in the relevant issues for Northern Ireland.
In 2011, for example, the Committee produced a detailed response to the Northern
Ireland Department for Social Development’s consultation on the proposals that
led (in Britain) to the Welfare Reform Act 2012, identifying the proposals that
could be problematic for Northern Ireland, while recognising the continuing pattern
of social security convergence.63 The Committee’s minutes also demonstrate that
there are regular updates provided on developments in Northern Ireland and
considerations of Northern Ireland-specific issues arising from regulations.64 The
SSAC consultations take account of evidence from stakeholders in Northern Ireland
and the Committee visits Northern Ireland as part of its stakeholder engagement
and to understand the out-workings of parity-based legislation.65
The parity paradox has been a vexing political issue for Northern Ireland. The
powers to create a bespoke social security system have already been granted to
the Northern Ireland executive, but the ability to exercise those powers remain
thwarted, even though the political imperative for parity is less dominant within
a power-sharing executive that has a mix of nationalist and unionist outlooks.What
59Northern Ireland Assembly, “Understanding parity—departmental briefing paper” (2011) Research Paper 99/11,
para.8 at http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/social-dev/urban-regen/dsd_briefing_paper_parity
.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2016].
60 For example, in relation to cross-border working arrangements or housing policy limited by a “sectarian”
geography and available social housing stock—see Committee for Social Development, “Report on the Welfare
Reform Bill (NIA Bill 13/11-15)” (2013) NIA 74/11-15, Minutes of evidence—25 October 2012; K. Gibb, “The
‘bedroom tax’ in Scotland” (2013) Scottish Parliament paper 409; SSAC, “Minutes: 27 January 2016”.
61For example, in relation to work-focused conditionality, controlled in Britain by DWP but controlled in Northern
Ireland (up to May 2016) by a separate Department of Employment and Learning. See Northern Ireland Assembly,
“Understanding parity” (2011) Research Paper 99/11, para.8 at http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents
/social-dev/urban-regen/dsd_briefing_paper_parity.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2016]. Responsibility for employment
services and social security in Northern Ireland has now been united within the new Department for Communities.
62D. Birrell and D. Heenan, “Devolution and social security: the anomaly of Northern Ireland” (2010) 18 Journal
of Poverty and Social Justice 281, 289.
63 SSAC, “21st Century Welfare: SSAC response to DSD in Northern Ireland” at https://www.gov.uk/government
/publications/21st-century-welfare-ssac-response-to-dsd-in-northern-ireland [Accessed 24 October 2016].
64 See, e.g. SSAC, “Minutes: 27 January 2016” where the Northern Ireland dimension was part of the Committee’s
decision to take DWP regulations on formal referral: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/500459/ssac-minutes-270116.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2016].
65 The February 2016 stakeholder visit to Northern Ireland involved the Committee meeting with the Social
Development Minister, senior officials in the Department for Social Development and the Social Security Agency,
Social Security Agency frontline staff, the Social Security Commissioners for Northern Ireland, the Social Development
Committee, and with a range of voluntary sector groups.
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has supplanted this imperative is the need for financial agreement: the 1926 position
of political parity driving the need for financial subsidies has instead become one
where parity is consequential to financial subsidy and not the driver of it. Attempts
to break free from this model—and from the ideological position underpinning
the Welfare Reform Act 2012—have led to a series of constitutional cliff-edges
on which the Northern Ireland Assembly has been perched. The latest
intergovernmental agreement—the 2015 “Fresh Start” agreement—has been enough
to save the Assembly from falling, but does not escape the parity bind that led to
the cliff in the first place.66 The “Fresh Start” agreement allows the Northern Ireland
Assembly to deviate from the welfare reforms by providing temporary, transitional
protection,67 alongside some softening of the hardest edges of reform.68 Policy
divergence focuses on mitigating the impact of the ‘bedroom tax’, providing
additional support for carers and the disabled, replacing the Social Fund, not
implementing the highest level of sanction, operational variations in UC and a
new policy initiative to create a “cost of working allowance” to mitigate the
forthcoming cut in working allowance for UC. The pattern of parity will continue
to drive devolution for the near future but the events of 2011 to 2015 show that
sub-state legislators are now less willing to accept that parity can “simply be
justified by default”.69 The challenge will be to understand the mix of devolved
provision alongside centrally determined entitlements. The importance of oversight
for Northern Ireland is therefore likely to increase. The question that arises is
whether there is a need for a similar role in relation to devolved social security
arrangements in Scotland.
Scotland
The granting of devolved social security powers in Scotland is considerably more
recent than in Northern Ireland, and while similar fiscal restraints underpin the
social security settlements, the move to devolution in Scotland has been influenced
by different factors. Where the history of social security devolution in Northern
Ireland is grounded in a politically driven desire for parity, Scottish history speaks
66Northern Ireland Office, “A fresh start: the Stormont agreement and implementation plan” (2015). For discussion,
see M. Simpson, “The social union after the coalition: devolution, divergence and convergence” (2016) Journal of
Social Policy 1. The constitutional solution that arose from this political agreement was to pass Northern Ireland’s
devolved social security powers back to Westminster through a Legislative Consent Motion, which gave authority
to Westminster to pass the (expedited) Northern Ireland (Welfare Reform) Act 2015, which in turn gave the UK
government the authority to pass theWelfare Reform (Northern Ireland) Order 2015 (SI 2015/2006), which replicates
the Welfare Reform Act 2012 (with some limited exceptions) and gives the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
the power to make the associated regulations. The Legislative Consent Motion also gives authority to Westminster
to approve the welfare clauses of the Welfare Reform and Work Bill as initially introduced at Westminster, with any
amendments to be brought back to the Northern Ireland Assembly: See G. McKeever, “Welfare reform in Northern
Ireland” (2016) 23 J.S.S.L. 8–10.
67Welfare Reform Mitigations Working Group, “Report” (2016) at https://www.executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/sites
/default/files/publications/ofmdfm/welfare-reform-mitigations-working-group-report.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2016];
see McKeever, “Welfare reform in Northern Ireland” (2016) 23 J.S.S.L. 9–10.
68Most notably through the political agreement that the Social Sector Size Criteria, or “bedroom tax”, will not be
applied to Northern Ireland for 4 years, although the legislative vehicle for this has not yet been agreed; that the
highest level sanction will not apply to Northern Ireland; and some claimants will be compensated for financial loss,
normally for a year.
69McKeever, “Reforming social security appeal tribunals in Northern Ireland?” (2010) 17 J.S.S.L. 71, 77. Further,
as the recent judicial review of the eligibility criteria for widowed parent’s allowance demonstrates, the more onerous
requirements for human rights compliance placed on the devolved legislatures have potential to underpin a legal
challenge to parity: “In the matter of an application by Siobhan McLaughlin for judicial review” [2016] NIQB 11;
see also M. Simpson, “Case analysis” (2016) 23 J.S.S.L. 106.
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more clearly to a consensus on Scottish national identity, distinct from the rest of
the UK, emerging from the post- world war two arguments for Scottish home rule.
The realisation of such ideological divergence faced similar financial limitations
that were evident in Northern Ireland, namely a much higher unemployment rate
than in England and the need for a substantial financial settlement to deal with
this. The difference for the Westminster Government, however, concerned
Scotland’s relative political power. Walker notes that not only did theWestminster
Government wish to avoid replicating (with Scotland) what it saw as an
unsatisfactory financial relationship with Northern Ireland, but that it regarded
Scotland as being in a more stable and unified political state than Northern Ireland
that would put Scotland in a stronger position to demand a more attractive
devolutionary settlement.70 While the post-1945 welfare state and its benefits of
universalism served to undo many of the arguments for a Scottish Government,71
it was the long period of Conservative rule from 1979–1997 that enabled the
narrative of Scottish devolution to refocus on the distinctiveness of Scottish identity,
in ideological opposition to Conservative policies, including social security.72 In
essence, the social union that had acted as the glue for Scotland to remain within
the UK began to come unstuck.
The ScotlandAct 1998, which created the powers to establish a devolved national
legislature, did not devolve any social security powers to the Scottish Parliament,73
leading Spicker to conclude that “the formal powers of the Scottish Government
in respect of benefits [were] less than those of an English local authority”.74 Such
restrictions went against the grain of political developments in Scotland, where
the devolved government, led from 2007 by the SNP, was developing a more
distinctive anti-poverty rhetoric in its push for Scottish independence.75 Some
limited powers to promote welfare were provided under the Local Government
(Scotland) Act 2003 and these were used by the Scottish Government in the
2011–2016 administration to initiate different schemes in response to welfare
reforms brought forward by the UK Government.76 Scott and Wright, however,
point to the lack of debate by the SNP Government on UK-wide cooperation on
core questions of poverty, highlighting the double bind of fiscal constraints on
70Walker “Scotland, Northern Ireland and Devolution” (2010) 24 Contemporary British History 235, 238–239.
Walker points to the evidence of this in the decision of the Scottish Council of the Labour Party in 1958 to drop its
historic commitment to Scottish Home Rule.
71Walker “Scotland, Northern Ireland and Devolution” (2010) 24 Contemporary British History 235, 246; G.
Lodge and A. Trench, Devo more and welfare: devolving benefits and policy for a stronger union (London: IPPR,
2014), p.6.
72 See L. Patterson, A Diverse Assembly: The debate on a Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1998); G. Leicester, Scotland’s parliament: fundamentals for a new Scotland Act (London: Constitution Unit,
1996); G. Mooney and C. Williams, “Forging new ‘ways of life’? Social policy and nation building in devolved
Scotland and Wales” (2006) 26 Critical Social Policy 458; K. Morgan, “Devolution and development: territorial
justice and the north-south divide” (2006) 36 Publius 189.
73The Scotland Act 1998 Ch.46 Sch.5F. The powers given to theWelsh assembly likewise excluded social security
powers: Government of Wales Act 1998 Ch.38; Government of Wales Act 2006 Ch.32.
74 P. Spicker, “The devolution of social security benefits in Scotland” (2015) 23 Journal of Poverty and Social
Justice 17, 20.
75See, e.g. N. Sturgeon, “Foreword from the Deputy First Minister” in Scottish Government,Child poverty strategy
for Scotland: our approach 2014–2017 (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2014), 3.
76 In particular, the focus was on mitigating the impact of the spare room subsidy, or “bedroom tax”, through
increased funding for DHPs, and on setting up the Scottish Welfare Fund to replace the national Social Fund: see K.
Berry,Discretionary housing payments (SPICe briefing 14/17, Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament, 2014);Welfare Funds
(Scotland) Act 2015 asp 5.
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policy divergence alongside the apparent incompatibility of social security ideology
north and south of the Scottish border.77
Up to this point, therefore, the role of the SSAC in relation to Scotland was to
consider the specific impact of DWP proposals on Scotland. As with Northern
Ireland, the danger remains of losing sight of a national, sub-state focus within the
wider UK agenda, but similarly there is evidence of the SSAC managing this
balance to enable specific consideration of Scottish issues to give effect to its
customary obligation to Scotland, through which deeper consideration can be given
to the wider policy issues. The Committee’s minutes, independent reports,
consultations, confidential discussions with officials and Ministers, and regular
stakeholder visits identify that Scottish specific issues are sought, raised and
considered, simultaneously informing the Committee’s understanding of Scottish
considerations while tailoring the fit of its recommendations to include the Scottish
perspective.78
Following the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the Smith Commission
set out the proposals for greater devolved powers which had been agreed by the
five main political parties in Scotland.79 In relation to social security this included
a mixture of devolved and reserved responsibilities80 and a joint UK-Scottish
ministerial working group on welfare reform was created to oversee the transfer.81
In Scotland, like Northern Ireland, social security devolution is limited, with a
similar profile of policy divergence. Disability and carers feature prominently, as
do top-up payments that echo the Northern Ireland focus onmitigations. Operational
variations for UC match those for Northern Ireland, as does the plan to mitigate
the “bedroom tax” entirely. The Scottish Welfare Fund has replaced the Social
Fund.
Bell has identified that there are “considerable overlaps between the devolved
and reserved benefits, which will add significantly to the complexity of an already
complex system” and recommended close co-operation between the DWP and its
77 G. Scott and S. Wright, “Devolution, social democratic visions and policy reality in Scotland” (2012) Critical
Social Policy 440.
78 The consideration of Scottish-specific issues is evident in, e.g. the Committee’s Independent Work Report on
localisation; the stakeholder visit to Scotland in 2015, which includedmeetings with Scottish parliamentary committees,
and the Committee’s bi-annual stakeholder event for 2016 that was held in Scotland; from private sessions held by
the Committee with DWP officials to review the social security issues arising from the Scotland Bill; and from
Committee minutes considering a range of Scotland-specific issues from the definition of care-leavers, to the scrutiny
of DWP Regulations arising from the impact of the Scottish rate of income tax.
79 Smith Commission, Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament
(Edinburgh: Smith Commission, 2014) at http://www.smith-commission.scot [Accessed 24 October 2016]. See
McKeever, (2015) 22 J.S.S.L. 16–18.
80The Smith Commission proposed devolving benefits for carers, disabled and sick people, and powers over support
for unemployed people, as well the power to create new benefits in areas of devolved responsibilities. UC would
remain a reserved benefit, administered and delivered by DWP, with some administrative powers devolved to the
Scottish Parliament relating to payment frequency, splitting of payments and housing costs, but not extending to the
earnings taper, conditionality and sanctions all of which would remain under the control of the UK Parliament. An
interim report by the Scottish Parliament’s Devolution (Further Powers) Committee in 2015 concluded that the UK
government’s proposed welfare provisions had not met the spirit and substance of the Commission’s recommendations:
“New Powers for Scotland: An Interim Report on the Smith Commission and the UK Government’s Proposals” SP
Paper No.720, Session 4, 2015. See McKeever, "Welfare reform and devolution" (2015) 22 J.S.S.L 71.
81 Scotland Office, “Scotland in the United Kingdom: An enduring settlement” Cm.8990, 2014. The Scottish
Parliament’s Devolution (Further Powers) Committee sets out the trajectory of debate from the Smith Commission
to the final version of the Scotland Bill which is recommended to the Scottish Parliament at http://www.scottish
.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/97413.aspx [Accessed 24 October 2016]. See T. Mullen,
“Devolution of Social Security” (2016) 20 Edinburgh Law Review 382 for an overview of the relevant issues.
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Scottish counterpart.82 The Scottish Parliament Devolution (Further Powers)
Committee gave some consideration to the issue of how the social security systems
run by both the Scottish and UK Governments would engage with and work with
each other, including taking evidence from the Scottish member of the SSAC, Jim
McCormick, who emphasised the “need to start thinking about appropriate
oversight, scrutiny and transparency arrangements so that …we have much better
machinery for independent and parliamentary oversight”.83 The Committee accepted
the point that intergovernmental relations would be crucial to the successful
operation of welfare policy in Scotland and the UK, and its interim report
recommended:
“[T]hat the principles which will govern the operation of inter-governmental
relations with regard to welfare should be placed in any future Bill devolving
power in this area … [T]he Committee expects that this will include the
principles via which Parliaments can maintain scrutiny and oversight of the
inter-governmental machinery with regard to welfare.”84
The Committee did not explicitly recommend that the SSAC (or any ALB) should
have an oversight role in Scotland, and the draft Scotland Bill did not contain any
clause to extend the oversight of the SSAC to the devolved social security powers
in Scotland. Nor is a role for the SSAC mentioned in the Welfare Reform
Committee’s report on the delivery of devolved social security services.85
The Fiscal Framework for Scotland inevitably dominatedmuch of the discussion
on the issues around the Scotland Act 2016,86 focusing on how it would operate
alongside the principle of “no detriment” and how the costs of Scottish policy
variations could be calculated, and met.87 At the core of much of the debate,
however, was how the different benefits and systems would interact with each
other. As Spicker notes:
“There is a risk that devolution of benefit systems could produce inequalities
and anomalies. There are some inconsistent provisions in the current system,
often arising from gaps or overlaps between benefits … Devolving some
benefits and not others creates a potential for generating further
anomalies—for example, creating situations where raising benefits in one
place led to loss of benefit in another.”88
The potential for anomalies seems greater where there are different ideological or
fiscal ambitions driving benefit delivery and design. The need for oversight to
82 D. Bell,Who will be affected by Scotland’s new welfare powers? (London: Centre on Constitutional Change,
2016) at http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/publications/reports/who-will-be-affected-scotland’s-new
-welfare-powers [Accessed 24 October 2016].
83 “New Powers for Scotland: An Interim Report on the Smith Commission and the UK Government’s Proposals”
(2015) SP Paper No.720, at para.316. See also paras 272–273, 310–312.
84 “New Powers for Scotland” (2015) SP Paper No.720, para.328. See also paras 336, 338–339, making similar
recommendations.
85Welfare Reform Committee, “The future delivery of social security in Scotland” (2015) SP Paper No.853.
86 The Scotland Bill was introduced in May 2015 and received Royal Assent on 23 March 2016.
87 HM Government and The Scottish Government, “The agreement between the Scottish government and the
UnitedKingdom government on the Scottish government’s fiscal framework” (2016) at https://www.gov.uk/government
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/503481/fiscal_framework_agreement_25_feb_16_2.pdf [Accessed 24
October 2016]. See Mullen, “Devolution of Social Security” (2016) 20 Edinburgh Law Review 382 for further
discussion on how Scotland’s devolved social security is to be financed.
88Spicker, “The devolution of social security benefits in Scotland” (2015) 23 Journal of Poverty and Social Justice
17–28, 22.
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scrutinise the legislative proposals giving life to potentially conflicting ambitions
would also, therefore, seem greater, as would the need to access expert and
independent advice to assist in the execution of newly acquired powers. In short,
the role of the SSAC in providing independent advice to the Scottish and UK
Governments to ensure coherence across related benefit systems would seem to
be required.
This is all the more necessary in light of the fact that the partially shared
competence over social security between the Scottish andWestminster Parliaments
is further complicated by the Sewel convention. The convention provides an
understanding that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate on devolved
matters without the consent of the devolved legislature, allowing co-ordinated
changes to be made to legislation that inevitably touches on both reserved and
devolved matters.89 Gallagher notes the practical value of the convention:
“Well established intergovernmental arrangements involved the devolved
administration in the preparation of such legislation, and the Scottish
Parliament has developed procedures for scrutinising and debating it.”90
The convention is given a statutory footing under s.2 of the Scotland Act 2016,
though the context of shared functions relating to social security are seen byMullen
and Craig to increase the potential for conflict over the operation of the convention,
to the point where they question the extent to which s.2 will be justiciable. Their
particular concern is the lack of clarity over the role of the convention when shared
or overlapping competence is at issue:
“notably whether the convention applies when a Bill clearly has a reserved
purpose but also has substantial effects upon devolved matters … [T]he UK
government has too much freedom to determine the scope of application of
the convention when there ought to be a shared understanding between the
UK and the devolved parliaments and executives.”91
The absence of a clear constitutional architecture to ensure a shared understanding
and intergovernmental cooperation on social security, returns us once again to the
potential to enable independent oversight of the whole system.
During the Committee debates by the House of Lords, an amendment to the
Scotland Bill was proposed by Lord Kirwood to extend the role of the SSAC in
relation to devolved social security issues in Scotland.92 Pointing to the SSAC’s
parallel role over devolved social security issues in Northern Ireland, and echoing
the original rationale for the SSAC’s creation, Kirkwood questioned why the
Government was not making similar provision for Scotland:
“It is … essential to have a single statutory independent UK body that can
provide oversight … of the implications of the way the exercise of the fully
devolved powers in Scotland and Northern Ireland are impacting on the
89 J. D. Gallagher, All aboard the constitutional express? Where is the Scotland Bill taking the UK? (Oxford:
Nuffield College, 2015).
90 Gallagher, All aboard the constitutional express? (Oxford: Nuffield College, 2015).
91 T. Mullen and S. Craig, “The Immigration Bill, reserved matters and the Sewel convention” 15 April 2016,
Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum at http://www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis
/ViewBlogPost/tabid/1767/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/6959/Tom-Mullen-and-Sarah-Craig-The-Immigration
-Bill-Reserved-Matters-and-the-Sewel-Convention.aspx [Accessed 24 October 2016].
92 HL Debs, Vol.769 col. 98, 22 February 2016.
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effectiveness and coherence of the social security system across the whole
of the United Kingdom.”93
The Government’s response was to confirm its position that the SSAC’s role would
remain unchanged:
“Once legislative competence has been given to the Scottish Parliament it
may, if it wishes, put in place separate scrutiny bodies to consider legislative
proposals made by the Scottish Government within the scope of the legislative
competence and report back to Scottish Ministers. It is for this reason that
we do not support [the amendment] which seeks to change the role of the
SSAC to give it a duty to advise ScottishMinisters. We would of course want
to put in place arrangements to facilitate information and co-operation between
the two Governments.”94
Kirkwood’s amendment was withdrawn. A further amendment was then moved
by the Government to confirm that the SSAC cannot give advice to Scottish
Ministers on those benefits for which the Scottish Parliament has legislative
competence, and that Scottish Ministers will not be able to refer draft regulations
to the SSAC for consideration.95
Little insight is provided by this response into why the role of SSAC could, or
would not be extended. There is no indication of how Kirkwood’s amendment
would be given effect. The statutory appointment of the Northern Ireland SSAC
member is done in consultation with the Northern Ireland department, but the
appointment is made by the UK Minister.96 It is not possible to identify from the
Committee stage debates whether similar arrangements were in mind for Scotland,
or whether they would be politically acceptable, or whether the UK Government
wished to avoid the SSAC acting as a melting pot for the consideration of
potentially conflicting policy objectives in draft legislative form. If devolved social
security legislation from Scotland were within the SSAC’s remit the potential
would arise for devolved policies to have an impact on reserved ones, giving the
Committee the option to consider comparative approaches to social security
objectives, and creating the possibility that the Committee might favour—and
recommend—the Scottish rather than Westminster approach, embodying a form
of competitive federalism. This would be a different approach than the current
co-operativemodel that Northern Ireland policy has mimicked, where the dominant
practice has been for central policy to dictate regional implementation.97 There
may be some historical echoes of the wish to keep amore politically united Scotland
at greater arm’s length in order to limit devolutionary demands. Regardless of the
reason, however, the outcome for the SSAC is now clear.
93 HL Debs, Vol.769 col.98, 22 February 2016.
94 Lord Dunlop, Scotland Office, HL Debs, Vol.769 col.104, 22 February 2016.
95 Scotland Act s.33. The provision also applies to the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council.
96 An equivalent non-statutory arrangement applies to the Scottish and Welsh appointments to the SSAC.
97 In principle, however, there is nothing (other than cost) to prevent Northern Ireland pursuing policy innovations
as long as the required consultation takes place. The SSAC would then have to scrutinise these legislative proposals
which might in turn influence developments in UK policy. If McLaughlin [2016] NIQB 11 is upheld on appeal then
the Northern Ireland Assembly will have to amend the Pensions Act (NI) 2015 because of non-compliance with
art.14/art.8 ECHR regardless of whether Parliament chooses to amend the equivalent Pensions Act 2014.
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Options for the future?
The oversight of UK-wide social security provisions remains within the remit of
the SSAC, as does the interaction of devolved provision in Northern Ireland with
the provisions in Britain. What is absent however, is oversight of how devolved
Scottish provision interacts with social security provision in other parts of the UK,
for claimants whose geographical circumstances place them at the centre of this
overlap gap. The Scottish issue remains a live interest because the out-workings
of devolving social security powers to Scotland are not yet clear, including how
related areas will be impacted, such as dispute resolution and tribunal appeals.98
In particular, it is not clear what the potential consequences are where policy
changes are made by either Government.99 There is a lack of constitutional clarity
on whether the Scotland Act 2016 resolves the questions raised by the Sewel
convention as to whether or when the UK Parliament can legislate on issues that
impact on devolved provision.100 It is not clear whether there are adequate
intergovernmental mechanisms in place to deal with connected social security
issues. And further uncertainty remains over whether the Strathclyde review will
be implemented, which would reduce the scope for reviewing regulations in
Parliament, making the SSAC’s role even more critical as the only substantial
review mechanism.
The devolutionary arrangements for social security have been created on an ad
hoc, politically reactive basis. The Constitution Select Committee recognises that
a fragmented welfare system is the nature of devolution but highlights the
constitutional complexity caused by such an asymmetrical system, and laments
the absence of a principled approach to devolution to date.101 Given the (rhetorically)
different drivers for social security policy north and south of the Scottish border,102
it is important to consider what potential options exist to help develop coherence
across devolved and reserved social security administrations, even for an interim
period. While there is no agreed set of devolutionary principles that can be drawn
on here, there are an emerging set of core principles that can guide and evaluate
the options for co-ordinated social security oversight, which frame the objective
of avoiding unintended, adverse consequences: impartiality that focuses on how
the system works rather than on policy development, independence to draw on
98 See Mullen, “Devolution of Social Security” (2016) 20 Edinburgh Law Review 382. The need for coherence
might be more urgent if Scotland were to emulate the tendency for sub-state regions in asymmetric devolution
settlements to seek to increase their powers over time: see B. Giordano and E. Roller, “Té para todos? A comparison
of the processes of devolution in Spain and the UK” (2004) 36 Environment and Planning 2163.
99 Evidence to the Constitution Select Committee identifies that the Scotland Act 2016 does not make provision
for what happens if there is political disagreement that results in stalemate, and suggests that, on the basis of the
experience of Northern Ireland, HM Treasury may decide to reduce the block grant for welfare spending, effectively
creating a financial veto over conflicting policies: Constitution Select Committee, “The Union and devolution: 10th
report of session 2015–16” (2016) HL Paper No.149, Mark Durcan MP, question 310 at http://data.parliament.uk
/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/constitution-committee/the-union-and-devolution/oral
/28313.html [Accessed 24 October 2016].
100 The implication is that if the UK Parliament is legislating on a devolved social security matter that would
normally fall outside the SSAC’s remit, the UK parliamentary legislation may then fall within SSAC’s remit.
101 In particular the Committee highlights the difficulties faced by civil servants in reconciling conflicting priorities
between devolved and central government policies. Among its recommendations are the need to consider formal
structures to manage intergovernmental relations in social security and tax policy, and to create departmental concordats
to set out how devolved administrations are to be consulted on the impact of changes to UK government policy:
Constitution Select Committee, “The Union and devolution” (2016) HL Paper No.149.
102N. McEwen, “The territorial politics of social policy development in multilevel states” (2005) 15 Regional and
Federal Studies 537; G. Mooney and G. Scott, “The 2014 Scottish independence debate: questions of social welfare
and social justice” (2015) 23 Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 5.
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evidence to identify where claimants may fall between the gaps between the
systems, and expertise that enables legislative coherence.
Option 1: do nothing
The default option is to leave the chips as they have fallen. The UK Government
explicitly rejected an amendment to include Scotland’s devolved social security
powers within the SSAC’s remit, and so, arguably, that is that. Any developments
undertaken by the Scottish Government will not change this fact, and the
consideration of Scottish perspectives by the SSAC will have to cope with this
limitation. The difficulty with option 1 is that it does not progress the oversight
required for the divergent and interacting systems; it offers no opportunity to
review the coherence in social security provision for claimants moving around the
UK and provides no reassurance of extra-parliamentary, independent scrutiny.
Option 2: amend the legislation
There is no obvious legislative impediment to amend the newly created Scotland
Act 2016, and (consequentially) the Social Security Administration Act 1992, to
expand the SSAC’s remit to include devolved Scottish social security powers.
While there is much to recommend this option from the perspective of coherence
in particular, it is politically untenable and so remains in the realm of idealistic
rather than realistic.103
Option 3: create a Scottish oversight committee
This option remains wide open, and was clearly flagged by the UK Government
as a way for the Scottish Government to manage the social security oversight gap.
The Scottish Government’s consultation on its new social security system invites
responses to specific questions on independent scrutiny of Scottish social security
arrangements and so, politically, option 3 would seem the most viable and has the
added advantage of providing an opportunity to consider what such a body might
look like.104
On the assumption that the Scottish Government will develop a Scottish social
security advisory body, then further variables emerge in relation to its remit and
relationship with the SSAC. The most straightforward version of this model might
be to create an independent body with no connection to the SSAC, and with a remit
to advise only on devolved social security issues. No permissions or cooperation
arrangements would be required, and so no negotiation with UK Government
departments would be required. This was the option recommended by the
independent Expert Working Group on Welfare, and indeed the remit proposed
for a Scottish Social Security Commission went beyond the SSAC’s remit to
103The political opposition is likely to be held jointly, with the UK Government unlikely to be willing to relinquish
power here, and the Scottish Government (and Scottish Parliament) also more likely to prefer a separate,
made-in-Scotland solution.
104 Scottish Government, “Consultation on Social Security in Scotland” (2016) at https://consult.scotland.gov.uk
/social-security/social-security-in-scotland/consultation/subpage.2016-06-22.9101210037/ [Accessed 24 October
2016].
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include powers to review the social security system.105 Significantly, however, the
recommendation was premised on the working assumption that Scotland would
vote to become independent, and so the need to anticipate interaction between
devolved and reserved powers did not arise. Such a body could still assess the
impact of devolved provision as it interacts with reserved provision but, inevitably,
would not have the advantages of insight that the SSAC has access to, without
duplicating the work done by the SSAC, and the only power available where
reserved and devolved provision conflicts would be to amend the devolved
provision rather than seek to influence change through oversight of reserved powers.
For these reasons, a more advantageous version might entail a relationship with
the SSAC, to facilitate communication on common issues and seek to capitalise
on overlaps in Scottish and UK-wide expertise. A relationship between a Scottish
oversight body and the SSAC might take one of three broad configurations:
Option 3A
This relationshipmodel might seek to emulate the SSAC’s relationship with HMRC
and HMTreasury which is based on aMemorandum of Understanding that enables
the SSAC to discharge non-statutory functions in relation to benefits and tax
credits.106 In this hypothetical configuration, the SSAC could be given a
non-statutory role to provide advice to the Scottish Government and be empowered
to share this advisory process with the Scottish advisory body. If the hypothetical
ideal was stretched to its limit, the Scottish advisory body would have similar
powers to advise DWP, and to share its advisory considerations with the SSAC.
This model has its limitations in relation to the potential for cultural clashes between
governments and/or their advisory bodies, but more significantly it has political
limitations given that the UK Government blocked an extension of the SSAC’s
remit on the basis that it was not the SSAC’s role to provide advice to Scottish
Ministers.107 The most far-reaching version of this model also assumes that the
Scottish Government is keen to reciprocate by submitting its proposals to the
SSAC, which may not be wise to assume.
Option 3B
Alternatively, a formal relationship might seek to have members common to both
oversight bodies. One means of achieving this would be to create ex offico
membership for each body, so that a member of the SSAC would be entitled to sit
on the Scottish body by virtue of their SSAC position, and a reciprocal arrangement
would create an ex officio position on the SSAC for a member of the Scottish
body.108 This would require political co-operation to secure agreement from the
105 Expert Working Group on Welfare, “Rethinking welfare: fair, personal and simple” (2014) para.4.69-4.71 at
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0045/00451915.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2016].
106 The MOU provides that the Committee will provide advice generally, both on its own initiative and at the
request of Treasury Ministers and HMT/HMRC officials, on tax credits, child benefit and guardian’s allowance and
aspects of policy on National Insurance contributions that affect benefit entitlement.
107The financial out-workings of this obstacle might be that DWPwould not want to fund the SSAC to give advice
to the Scottish Government, while the Scottish Government may not want to contribute to funding the SSAC if it is
already funding its own advisory body.
108 There may need to be more than one ex officio member, given the concerns that a single membership position
may not be sufficiently representative.
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Secretary of State for Work and Pensions that the membership of the SSAC could
be extended to include a Scottish advisory body member, or that the customary
Scottish appointee would, in practice, be a member of the Scottish advisory body.
The political obstacle here is that the Secretary of State’s power to appoint a
member of the SSAC would be transferred to the Scottish Government.
A variation on this sharedmembershipmodel might be to emulate other UK-wide
ALBs, such as the (now defunct) Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council
(AJTC). Under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the AJTC and
its Scottish andWelsh Committees were required to have some sharedmembership,
transferring the experience and expertise between the state and sub-state bodies.109
Under this statutory framework, the AJTC included Scottish and Welsh members,
who then became members of the Scottish and Welsh committees, respectively.
The Scottish appointments to the AJTC were made by the Scottish Ministers with
the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor and the Welsh Ministers, with equivalent
arrangements for the Welsh AJTC members. The Scottish Government is not
authorised to appoint the Scottishmember of the SSAC, and so the AJTC equivalent
model for the SSACwould require membership on the Scottish body to be reserved
for a SSACmember, in effect enabling the Secretary of State to dictate who would
be qualified to assume this position, something which might be politically
unpalatable in Scotland. The only difference between this and the ex officio model
would be that the latter would allow the Scottish Government’s appointee to serve
on the SSAC, creating a greater degree of reciprocation.
Option 3C
Finally, an informal relationship between the two advisory bodies could be created,
with information sharing between each, facilitated through good Chair-to-Chair
relationships, visits and presentations by and to each committee. This might be
the easiest (political) option to arrange, but its limitation is the reliance on good
relations and perceptions of mutuality of benefit and co-operation as the driver,
which would require careful management and a high degree of diplomatic skill,
and—pragmatically at least—some degree of consent or acquiescence by the
Scottish and UK Ministers. The potential for other priorities to take precedence
over the management of this informal relationship also creates a risk with this
model, and particularly if the arrangement is not seen to develop productive
relationships. This model might be the best version of the “do nothing” approach,
so that no formal or statutory changes are made but discussions take place behind
the scenes so that communication channels are opened. The statutory remit of the
SSAC could be read expansively to enable invitations to be issued to a Scottish
oversight body, with visits reciprocated by the SSAC to enable it to understand
better the implications of DWP proposals for Scotland. Given the significance of
the need for the SSAC to understand these implications, however, a more formal
relationship with the Scottish oversight body might be more effective.
109 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 Sch.7. When the AJTC was abolished, the Scottish Committee
was replaced by the Scottish Tribunals and Administrative Justice Advisory Committee, established as an interim
committee with a lifespan of 2 years, ending in November 2015. See http://www.adminjusticescotland.com/Remit
%20&%20Working%20Practices.htm [Accessed 24 October 2016].
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The optimal oversight option will be the one that offers closest adherence to the
principles of impartiality, independence and expertise, to enable legislative
coherence that ensures the divergence between devolved and reserved social
security provision does not penalise claimants moving between the different
systems. What this means is that a framework is needed to avoid detriment to
individual claimants when the decision of one government adversely affects those
claiming social security from the other.
Conclusion
The landscape of social security is constantly changing, but the scale of legislative
change in the last ten years has been substantial, with the underpinning policy
rationale shifting further away from insurance based protection to time limited,
conditional support.110 The entrenched pattern of providing skeletal primary
legislation where political powers are not fully articulated highlights the weakness
of parliamentary oversightmechanisms in preventing executive creep into secondary
legislation. This is particularly true of social security scrutiny where the pattern
is stretched to extend the role of discretionary-based front line decision-making,
so that the exercise of executive powers in practice lack the legal certainty that
legislation can provide. These oversight problems are further complicated by the
inclusion of devolutionary practices, which may interact with, or be absorbed into,
central government oversight, but which rely on good intergovernmental
mechanisms and constitutional clarity to ensure that power, policy and practice
are coherent and not conflicting.
The scrutiny provided by the SSAC helps to address the oversight gaps that
inevitably emerge from parliamentary oversight, while bolstering the ability of
parliamentary systems to scrutinise more effectively,111 but new oversight gaps are
emerging as a result of devolution. The newest piece in the devolution puzzle is
the Scotland Act 2016, devolving some social security powers that will have to
work alongside reserved ones. This division of control is not clean cut between
Scotland and the UK; the two systems will have to work in harmony with each
other so that claimants do not fall between the gaps, but these gaps may not be
obvious, emerging instead as consequential and unintended impacts. The potential
for this to be realised is greater where the two systems are reviewed independently
of each other, and where the opportunity to see the interaction of the whole piece
is lost.
The UK Government rejected an amendment to the Scotland Bill that would
have seen the SSAC’s remit extend to advising the Scottish Government on
devolved social security matters, but the Scottish Government has the power to
create its own oversight body. The question that arises is whether an oversight
body for Scotland’s devolved system would adopt a Scotland-only approach or
seek to integrate a UK-wide perspective. It would seem an unnecessarily and
110 A. Porter and M. Riddell, “Iain Duncan Smith: my welfare reforms are Beveridge for today, with a hint of
Tebbit” Daily Telegraph, 6 November 2010 at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/8114432/Iain
-Duncan-Smith-My-welfare-reforms-are-Beveridge-for-today-with-a-hint-of-Tebbit.html [Accessed 28 September
2016]; S. A. Bello, “Social landlords and the courts bear the brunt for welfare reform” (2013) 16 Journal of Housing
Law 95; N. Harris, “The transition to universal credit” (2013) 20 J.S.S.L. 95.
111See, e.g. on theWelfare Reform andWork Bill: Public Bill Committee, 17 September 2015, 6th sitting, col.255;
HL Debs, Vol.768 cols 1862 and 1868, 3 February 2016; HL Debs, Vol.768 col.2124, 9 February 2016.
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unfeasibly narrow focus to exclude the wider picture—an argument that applies
not just to the Scottish approach but to that of the SSAC as well. Formal (and
transparent) cooperation between the two bodies, therefore, would seem to be the
best, and most feasible option for now, which, over time, could provide further
insight into whether an integrated oversight body might ultimately be required.
The SSAC currently operates under aMemorandum of Understanding to provide
advice to HMRC on a non-statutory basis. This model incorporates two separate
government departments but crucially only one government. The application of
this model to devolved oversight requires intergovernmental cooperation that was
denied, in principle, through the decision not to extend the SSAC’s remit to cover
devolved Scottish powers. A “soft” version of the statutorymodel might be possible
but it relies on assumed co-operation that is not yet evident. At the other end of
the scale of possibilities is the behind-the-scenes model, which relies on two
oversight committees developing an informal relationship to share information
that will assist in their respective oversight roles. The SSAC has good form on
this approach,112 but there are limitations on what can be delivered by each side in
the face of other statutory priorities. A final alternative would integrate the
perspectives through shared membership on each oversight body. This could be
through an ex officio position created to allow the SSAC to be represented on the
Scottish body, and vice versa, to share expertise between the bodies with the
objective of creating greater coherence through independent oversight. Again,
political choices would have to be made to facilitate this option, by creating an
additional position on the SSAC for a Scottish Government appointee, with
reciprocation by the Scottish oversight body. The variation on this approach would
be to reconfigure the criteria for the Scottish appointment to the SSAC to include
membership of the Scottish oversight body, and to reserve a position on the Scottish
oversight body for a SSAC member. There is not great deal in practical terms
between these last two variations in that each facilitate cross-membership, although
the political will to progress either has not yet been tested.
The choice of model is limited but the need for joint oversight remains. If a
single oversight body is not possible, then a way forward is required to enable
some shared oversight. Social security claimants are often managed by social
security legislation to behave in particular ways, and this requires a consistent and
coherent message that claimants can understand and respond to. A behavioural
incentive to remain only in one part of the UK so as not to fall foul of gaps between
devolved systems would seem to run counter to political objectives to “activate”
claimants to support themselves independently. More substantially, claimants who
move within the UK, through choice or compulsion, should not be penalised by
systems that are unable to work together. Oversight is needed not just to provide
expert, independent and impartial advice, but to ensure fairness in the treatment
of claimants regardless of their geographical circumstances.
112See, e.g. M. Betts, (1994) 1 J.S.S.L. 105, 109: “The Committee rarely has a high profile, except when our advice
is controversial and the media preface their reports with ‘even the Government’s own advisory committee…’. There
is much to be said for working quietly in the background, especially if things nevertheless get done.”; G. Saunders,
“Reflections on the development and work of the Social Security Advisory Committee” (2007) 15 Benefits 313. See
also engagement by the Committee with the Scottish Parliament’s Devolution (Further Powers) Committee, 19
February 2015, and the Welfare Reform Committee, 24 March 2015.
Legislative Scrutiny, Co-ordination and the SSAC 149
(2016) 23 J.S.S.L., Issue 3 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
